Anger and Indignation by Drummond, John J.
15
Here is laid the body of
Jonathan Swift, Doctor of Divinity,
Dean of this cathedral Church,
Where fierce indignation can no longer
Lacerate his heart.
Go, traveller, and imitate if you can
This vigorous Champion of Liberty.
Epitaph of Jonathan Swift
Indignation seems a kind of anger, but what kind? Both anger and indigna-
tion are responses to offences, but what, if anything, makes the difference 
between them? I shall consider these two questions in the light of a view of 
the emotions for which I have previously argued (Drummond 2004, 2006, 
2009, 2013, 2017). On this view, which is a modification of Edmund Hus-
serl’s account, the emotions involve feelings that can be considered in two 
respects. First, they are sensory states that register physiological changes in 
the body. Second, they are intentional feelings that (1) apprehend the affec-
tive or value-attribute of the thing or situation, which attribute is – to use 
language popularized by Anthony Kenny ([1963] 2003, 132) – the ‘formal’ 
object of the emotion, and (2) thereby grasp the ‘material’, that is, the con-
crete or particular, object of the emotion as positively or negatively valued or, 
perhaps, as indifferent. The emotion-type and its evaluative sense are founded 
on an underlying cognitive sense as grasped by a subject with a particular 
physiological constitution; a particular experiential history; and particular 
interests, concerns, and commitments. I distinguish mere intentional feelings 
from emotions in virtue of the degree of determination of the underlying 
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cognitive intentions; the more determinate the cognitive intention, the more 
clearly we can distinguish the type of emotion experienced.
Anger seems the easier emotion on which to get a grip, perhaps because 
it is widely considered one of the basic human emotions. Ever since Plato 
declared that anger was a manifestation of the spirited part (θυμός) of the 
soul and Aristotle defined anger as ‘a desire accompanied by pain, for a con-
spicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no 
call to slight oneself or one’s friend’ (Rhet. 1378a31–34), the basic outline of 
anger has remained more or less constant. There have been some changes, 
but they are not sufficient to alter our basic understanding. For example, 
while for Aristotle the notion of a ‘slight’ involved a ‘down-ranking’ in rela-
tion to the wrongdoer or to society as a whole (Nussbaum 2016, 5), by the 
time of the Stoics anger was defined more generally in terms of a ‘wrongful 
harm’ (Nussbaum 2016, 19–20). Therefore, in the contemporary world, Rob-
ert Roberts, for example, can still define anger as follows: ‘S has culpably 
offended in the important matter of X (action or omission) and is bad (is to 
some extent an enemy of what is good); I am in a moral position to condemn; 
S deserves (ought) to be hurt for X; may S be hurt for X’ (2003, 204). Notice 
the fundamental similarities with Aristotle’s view: (1) an agent S has wrong-
fully offended by doing or failing to do X, and (2) the one offended desires 
punishment or revenge in return.
One should not, however, lose sight of the important truth in Aristotle’s 
more limited notion of slight. At least in cases of moral wrongs, to do 
wrong to another entails a lack of respect for the other. As Aristotle put 
it, ‘A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in 
capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their 
superior. . . . Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks 
owe him good treatment’ (Rhet. 1378b35–1379a7). We can disagree with the 
details of the interpersonal and status aspects entailed by Aristotle’s view 
of the ties between respect and superiority; nevertheless, a fundamental 
truth remains. Wrongdoing violates our expectation of good treatment and 
thereby ‘slights’ us; it diminishes our relative status in the sense that it is a 
harm to our moral standing. Hence, when wronged, when our moral stand-
ing and our moral worth are diminished, ‘becoming angry with someone 
marks oneself as the person’s equal, as someone to be respected as a moral 
agent’ (Tessman 2005, 120).
While the definition of anger is more or less fixed, differences remain 
among the various views: Aristotle, for example, notes the feeling dimension – 
the pain at the wrong and the pleasure at the prospect of revenge – involved in 
anger, whereas both Roberts and Martha Nussbaum, denying that the feeling 
is part of the definition, do not. Aristotle leaves room for anger in cases where 
the offence is not a moral offence, as when a parent, on tripping over a toy left 
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on the floor in the middle of the room by her child or on finding her child’s 
unmade bed in the morning, gets angry at the child, or when someone, con-
struing his car as an agent, gets angry at the car for failing to start and starts 
pounding the dashboard (see Ben-Ze’ev 1992, 89, but cf. Nussbaum 2016, 
18–19). Roberts and Nussbaum, by contrast, implicitly or explicitly identify 
anger as a moral emotion insofar as anger involves beliefs about wrongdo-
ing in a moral sense. I say ‘implicitly’ because Nussbaum speaks of moral 
wrongdoing in anger only in rejecting views that distinguish resentment and 
indignation as differing from anger by virtue of their specific concern with 
moral wrongdoing (Nussbaum 2016, 262). Roberts is explicit: he notes that 
insofar as S’s offence is culpable, the one offended has the moral standing to 
condemn S.
In contrast to the more or less unified understanding of anger, there are 
significant differences among thinkers in the understanding of indignation. 
Aristotle thinks indignation the opposite of pity (Rhet. 1386b1). Whereas pity 
is experiencing pain at an undeserved evil befalling someone, indignation is 
experiencing pain at someone’s undeserved good fortune. The references to 
desert introduce notions of justice. Hence, indignation shares, at least in some 
respects, anger’s object: indignation is aimed at a wrong of some kind, but it 
is a specifically moral wrong. For Aristotle, both pity and indignation involve 
the moral domain and are indicative of a person’s good character insofar as 
‘it is our duty to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel 
indignation at unmerited prosperity’ (Rhet. 1386b12–15). Whereas Aristo-
tle contrasts, and thereby ties together, pity and indignation, Roberts pairs 
indignation with anger: ‘S has very culpably and shockingly offended in the 
important matter of X (action or omission) and is bad (is an enemy of what 
is good); I am very confident of being in a moral position to condemn; and 
S deserves (ought) to be hurt for X’ (Roberts 2003, 215). What distinguishes 
anger and indignation for Roberts is a matter of degree: indignation targets S 
as ‘very’ culpable and as having ‘shockingly’ offended. For Roberts, anger 
and indignation differ as a function of the severity of the offence motivating 
the emotional response and the culpability of the agent.
René Descartes, too, thinks indignation is directed towards those who do 
some evil to someone other than oneself (Descartes [1649] 1985, 397–99). 
Indignation on this view too is clearly a moral emotion in a way that anger, 
as suggested earlier, is not. At the same time, however, Descartes warns us 
that indignation is ‘observed much more in those who wish to appear virtuous 
than in those who really are virtuous’ (Descartes 1985, 398), a skeptical view 
of indignation later echoed by Friedrich Nietzsche:
For the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates himself with 
his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or society), may indeed, 
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morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied satyr, but in 
every other sense is the more ordinary, more indifferent, and less instructive 
case. And no one is such a liar as the indignant man. (Nietzsche 1954, 411–12)
In what follows and with these similarities and differences in mind, I shall 
sketch views of anger and indignation in such a way as to demarcate them and 
illustrate the significance of the demarcation. I claim that anger and indigna-
tion are different emotions in both their bodily and intentional aspects. I am 
less interested in deciding the question of whether indignation is a species of 
anger. I am interested instead in identifying the differences and then explor-
ing the relations between them such that we can understand why people might 
think they do or do not stand in a genus-species relation.
ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND EMBODIMENT
When angered, a subject normally has intense feelings triggered by the 
offence against her, a member of her family, or a close associate. These feel-
ings register a variety of physiological changes that are more pronounced in 
anger than in most other emotions. For example, the degree of the combina-
tion of the acceleration in heart rate and the increase in finger temperature 
seems unique to anger. The studies of Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen (1983) 
on the universality of basic emotions catalogued these differences in auto-
nomic nervous system responses. Table 2.1 illustrates the point.
A subsequent study by Levenson et al. (1992) concluded that there were 
cross-cultural similarities in the responses of the autonomic nervous system 
and attributed this similarity to evolutionary results that remained constant 
across different cultural developments. While it is doubtful that responses in 
the autonomic nervous system are sufficient to distinguish one emotion from 
another, they do measure the arousal involved in different emotions (Mauss 
and Robinson 2009, 214). In this respect, then, anger is a ‘hot’ emotion that 
Table 2.1. Heart Rate and Skin Temperature
Specific Emotion
Change in Heart Rate 
(beats/minute)
Change in Finger 
Temperature (°C)
Anger +8.0 +.16
Fear +8.0 – .01
Distress +6.5 +.01
Joy +2.0 +.03
Surprise +1.8 – .01
Disgust –0.3 –.03
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involves a greater degree of autonomic nervous system response than other 
basic emotions.
Other physiological changes associated with anger often involve a kind 
of contraction of the body, including that evidenced by a general tightening 
of the muscles in the body’s trunk, the characteristic tendency to clench the 
hands, and the facial expressions of anger. The latter typically include pull-
ing the eyebrows down and pulling the eyelids up, tightening the area around 
the eyes and the muscles in the jaw, a somewhat squared mouth with the lips 
rolled in and tightened or, when the mouth is open, a squarish shape. These 
autonomic nervous system changes, the facial changes, and the gross bodily 
changes are experienced in somaesthetic and kinaesthetic sensations, and 
these bodily feelings, insofar as the set of physiological changes are intense, 
contribute to the intensity of the felt anger.
If indignation were a kind of anger, we would expect similar physiological 
changes, even if with different intensity. However, there seem to be important 
differences. In indignation, the face manifests a set of changes similar to what 
we find in surprise or shock. The eyes widen with the eyebrows and eyelids 
pulled up, and the mouth opens in a more circular than squarish shape. But 
the surprise is negatively valenced; we experience a feeling of shock at an 
affront or brazen wrong of some kind, and we cannot quite believe that what 
we have witnessed (directly, through media, or through testimony) has in fact 
happened. We adopt a look that says ‘How dare you. . .?’ or ‘How awful!’ 
Moreover, the body opens up rather than contracts; we straighten ourselves, 
raising our shoulders and head.
Why are these ways in which indignation and anger differ in their expres-
sion at the physiological level important? It is because they suggest, even if 
they do not establish, more significant differences in how anger and indigna-
tion take their objects, in how their objects affect us. If nothing else, these 
differences make us reflect more carefully on the apparent similarity of anger 
and indignation.
ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND INTENTIONALITY
One might object to the claim that these physiological differences suggest 
that anger and indignation are different emotions by recalling the fact that 
the two emotions have the same ‘formal’ object. They grasp their material 
object – a person, action, situation, or event – as involving a harm, wrong, 
or injustice of some kind. Might it not be the case, then, that anger and 
indignation differ solely in the intensity of feelings involved and in their 
bodily expressions? I suggest, however, that these differences mark more 
fundamental differences between the two emotions in both their subjective 
16028-0090d-1pass-r02.indd   19 24-08-2017   01:04:12
20 Chapter 2
and objective dimensions. That is to say, anger and indignation differ both 
experientially and in their intentionality. The experiential differences are 
due not only to the already noted differences in their felt physiological 
changes but also to how they are directed to their objects. The intentional 
differences in how they are directed to their objects correlate with dif-
ferences in their intended objects, that is, with how those objects display 
themselves in the emotion.
One possibility for distinguishing anger and indignation, as Descartes has 
suggested, is to say that anger involves a wrong done to me or to those relevant 
to my sense of well-being (e.g., my family members, colleagues), while indig-
nation involves a wrong done to persons unconnected to me. Anger, in other 
words, would involve a (broadly conceived) self-targeted wrong, whereas 
indignation would involve an other-targeted wrong. This seems incorrect, how-
ever. There are cases where I might become intensely angry when wrongs are 
done to others. I think that such cases are often mixed with indignation or that 
there is another emotion in play that combines elements of anger and indigna-
tion. I shall return to this point later. For the moment, it suffices to say that 
there seems to be something very much like anger involved in such reactions.
Conversely, there are cases where I may become indignant, rather than 
angry, at wrongs done to me. Consider the case of someone’s making an 
impertinent remark addressed to me. I do not become intensely angry, but 
I am nevertheless offended. Indeed, I am morally offended by the lack of 
respect indicated by the remark. Beyond physiological differences, this moral 
dimension of indignation, I believe, marks a second, fundamental difference 
from anger, and I shall return to this point later.
The previous example brings to mind yet a third difference between anger 
and indignation, one marked by the prepositions we use when speaking of 
them. We say that we are angry at someone for a wrong done or at something 
because it has harmed our well-being in some way. To use Roberts’s example 
(2003, 60–64), I am angry at George on account of his remark at a faculty 
meeting. Or I might be angry at my car on account of its not starting and 
causing me to miss an important committee meeting (although in ordinary 
circumstances, that might make me happy). Our anger is directed at the agent 
of the wrongdoing or the cause of the harm. By contrast, I am indignant about 
something. We name not the wrongdoer or cause, but the harm, the wrong or 
offence, or the situation giving rise to the wrong or offence (Roberts 2003, 
216, although Roberts does not acknowledge this in his defining proposition 
for indignation). We might, for example, be indignant about the slaughter of 
non-combatants in war zones, systemic racism or sexism, or a mean-spirited 
immigration policy. Our concern here has to do primarily with the offence or 
with social structures and institutions that perpetuate a wrongful situation and 
only secondarily with the agent(s) of the wrongdoing. There is a difference, 
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in other words, in how the two emotions take their objects and in the respect 
under which these objects are taken.
With these considerations in mind, I propose the following analysis of the 
intentional structure of anger:
A’s anger is an intentional feeling of distress
• involving intensely felt (sensed) physiological changes and bodily 
expressions,
• grounded in the recognition (e.g., a perception, judgement, or belief ) of 
S’s φ-ing A or a person or persons close to A,
• disclosing S’s φ-ing A or a person or persons close to A as a wrong or 
offence of some kind, and
• targeting
• primarily S as the wrongdoer or offender, and
• secondarily the offence.
For indignation, by contrast, I propose the following structure:
A’s indignation is an intentional feeling of distress
• involving felt (sensed) physiological changes and bodily expressions,
• grounded in the recognition (e.g., a perception, judgement, or belief ) of 
S’s φ-ing P (who can be, but need not be, identical to A),
• coupled with intentional feelings of moral superiority,
• disclosing (i) S’s φ-ing P as a wrong or an offence against A’s under-
standing of the social or moral order, or (ii) the social, moral, and politi-
cal institutions, structures, systems (or systemic factors), and practices 
permissive of S’s φ-ing P as a wrong or an offence against A’s under-
standing of a deeper social or moral order [or (iii) both], and
• targeting
•  primarily the offence or institutions, structures, systems, and practices 
permissive of the offence, and
•  secondarily S as the agent of the wrongdoing or the institutions, struc-
tures, systems, and practices that allow or embody the offence.
We can now more clearly see what makes the difference between anger 
and indignation. Indignation is often a ‘cooler’ emotion than anger, lacking 
the intensity of feeling characteristic of anger. More important, indignation is 
a moral, social, and political emotion in a way that anger is not or, at least, is 
not necessarily. There are three aspects to the moral character of indignation. 
First, indignation discloses the wrong or offence as a moral wrong or offence, 
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whereas anger need not. Second, insofar as indignation discloses a moral 
offence, the subject experiencing indignation is also self-aware in a particular 
way. She is pre-reflectively – and in some cases reflectively – aware of herself 
as in a morally superior position. In recognizing S’s φ-ing P as morally wrong, 
in other words, S is aware of herself as in a position to pass moral judgement 
on the action or situation about which she is indignant. This does not mean 
that she actually frames an explicit judgement; she might just recognize – 
perceive as it were – the injustice of the action or situation about which she is 
indignant. But she is aware of her position as one from which such a judge-
ment can be made. Third, given that indignation is a moral emotion, we think 
of those who fail to be indignant at social, economic, or political injustices as 
failing morally, whereas we do not think that of people who fail to be angry.
Indignation, then, differs from anger in that it is not in the first instance 
directed at the wrongdoer; it is directed at the situations, the contexts, the 
institutions, and the systemic features and practices of societies in which 
moral wrongs and injustices are embedded. Indignation has an irreducible 
socio-political character, even when the moral wrong is to be done to an indi-
vidual. Whether the wrong is a harm to an individual – for example, stealing 
someone’s tomatoes or making an impertinent remark – or a harm to a group 
arising from a social, economic, or political order embodying, say, systemic 
racism, the offence or situation permissive of the offence is a challenge to 
one’s understanding (right or wrong) of what the social and moral order 
should be, and indignation is an appropriate response, both well motivated 
and epistemically justified.
In a recent episode of the television series Downton Abbey, the Dowager 
Countess of Grantham (Violet Crawley) scolds her maidservant (Gladys 
Denker) for what Crawley takes to be inappropriate and impertinent remarks 
to Dr. Clarkson. Crawley is both angry, punishing Denker for her imperti-
nence, and indignant. However, I believe Crawley’s indignation is the more 
fundamental emotion in this scene, in part, because her facial structure and 
bodily comportment express indignation more than anger and, more funda-
mentally, because it is indignation’s recognition of the nature of the situation 
that motivates and justifies Crawley’s anger. Denker’s offence, on the sur-
face, was an impertinent remark. But there was a deeper offence: Denker’s 
action challenged the social order to which Crawley was devoted, an order 
in which maidservants did not criticize members of the upper class directly, 
that is, to their faces. The issue was not the truthfulness of what Denker said; 
the issue was the mere fact of her saying it to Clarkson. Crawley’s remark in 
reprimanding Denker is telling: ‘It is not your place even to have opinions 
about my acquaintance, let alone express them’. It is not Denker’s place in the 
social order to express her views about the behaviour of someone superior to 
her rank, and by criticizing Clarkson, she had overstepped the boundaries of 
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what is permissible for someone in her station in the social order. Crawley’s 
anger was predicated on and justified (in Crawley’s own eyes) by the social 
and political character of the remark. Its impertinence carried social and 
political weight.
I earlier indicated that I was less interested in deciding the question of 
whether indignation is a species of anger. The characterizations presented 
earlier provide an indication of why this is so. Both anger and indignation 
are intentionally directed to both an agent – or an institution, structure, sys-
tem, or set of practices, all of which can possess agential features insofar as 
they can cause harms to individuals – and an offence. But the primary foci 
of anger and indignation differ. If we take into account only their structures 
as described earlier, when I am angry, I am not indignant, and when I am 
indignant I am not angry. If the relation were a genus-species relation, when 
I experienced the specific emotion (say indignation), I would, by definition, 
also experience the generic emotion (anger). Nevertheless, their structures are 
such that it is easy to move back and forth between them. We can here invoke 
the familiar metaphor of a ‘family of emotions’. This expression captures 
what is at stake in the relation between anger and indignation; they are best 
thought of as siblings sharing a family resemblance. They look quite a bit like 
one another, but a closer look reveals important differences.
Nussbaum, however, explicitly rejects this view in an appendix devoted 
to anger and its species. Anger, the genus, is, in Nussbaum’s view, essen-
tially characterized by its double directedness to a person (or people) and an 
act – more specifically, a ‘wrongful harm’ (2016, 16) – and by what Nuss-
baum calls the ‘payback wish’ (2016, 21–22, 261). Both characteristics have 
been evidenced earlier in the definitions provided by Aristotle and Roberts. 
The different species of anger, then – emotions such as indignation, resent-
ment, and rage – cannot be characterized in ways that would sufficiently 
distinguish them as different emotions rather than as different variations of 
the same emotion. In this way, Nussbaum rejects views that would speak of 
an anger-family in which multiple relations exist among the siblings belong-
ing to the family.
Nussbaum considers and rejects three kinds of claims that advance the 
view that the siblings are different emotions, two of which are relevant to 
our purposes.1 The first claims that there are emotions, for example, resent-
ment and indignation, comparable to anger but that are specifically moral. 
Nussbaum rejects this view on the grounds that she has argued that anger 
already contains a judgement of wrongfulness (Nussbaum 2016, 262), includ-
ing anger rooted in moral grounds. However, she suggests, resentment and 
indignation do not differ in kind from anger since they too do not always 
contain specifically moral grounds. Indignation, for example, in her view, 
can arise in response to ‘insults to status and rank, about nonmoral affronts 
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of many kinds’ (2016, 262). The importance of the Crawley-Denker example 
is precisely that insults to status and rank are, in fact, moral offences to the 
extent that they involve explicit challenges to a social, political, and moral 
order. They challenge the target’s sense of the proper moral order, and the 
indignant response is directed to that challenge. This is central to my claim 
that indignation is a moral emotion in a way that anger is not.
The second claim challenged by Nussbaum concerns the payback wish. 
This is the claim that indignation is a form of anger that does not include the 
characteristic desire for payback. Nussbaum admits that there is a borderline 
case of anger or ‘quasi-anger’ (2016, 262), which she calls ‘Transition-
Anger’ (2016, 35), that is a ‘major exception’ to her view that anger always 
incorporates the desire for payback. Nussbaum’s identification of this spe-
cies extends her idea that one might become standardly angry when wronged 
and then, ‘in a cooler moment, head for the transition’ (2016, 35). To ‘head 
for the transition’ is to shift one’s attention from paying back the target of 
one’s anger to ‘more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking what can 
actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare’ (2016, 6), that 
is, what can be done to correct the wrong rather than punish the wrongdoer. 
Transition-Anger extends this idea: it is a species of anger in which one is 
at the transition point from the very beginning: ‘The entire content of one’s 
emotion is, “How outrageous! Something must be done about this” ’ (2016, 
35). Notice that Transition-Anger is focused from the beginning and entirely 
on the offence rather than the agent. In this respect, it seems much like 
indignation as I have outlined it, but Nussbaum explicitly rejects the name 
‘indignation’ for it, since she thinks that
a lot of cases we call ‘indignation’ involve some thought of payback. So I prefer 
the clearly made-up term. Transition-Anger does not focus on status; nor does 
it, even briefly, want the suffering of the offender as a type of payback for the 
injury. It never gets involved at all in that type of magical thinking. It focuses on 
social welfare from the start. Saying, ‘Something should be done about this’, it 
commits itself to a search for strategies, but it remains an open question whether 
the suffering of the offender will be among the most appealing. (Nussbaum 
2016, 35–36)
Notable is that Nussbaum has neither arguments nor examples to support 
the claim that there are cases of indignation that involve the desire for pay-
back. And when, later in the appendix (2016, 262), she simply refers to this 
previous assertion to dispense with the claim that indignation is not related 
to anger as species to genus, she fails to establish that indignation is simply 
a species of anger. One could object that the difference between Nussbaum’s 
and my position is merely terminological, but the difference is more than 
that. Nussbaum’s own position is that anger is essentially characterized by 
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the payback wish. Yet, she claims, Transition-Anger is not so characterized. 
This suggests that Transition-Anger cannot simply be a species of anger in 
the way that indignation is. Indeed, I would argue that Transition-Anger 
cannot even be a borderline species of anger since its intentional structure 
is significantly different. Moreover, anger, Nussbaum claims, targets the 
person committing the offence that angers, but Transition-Anger does not 
target the person. If this is so, and if Transition-Anger might simply be 
another name for indignation, the point remains that anger and indignation 
could not be related as genus and species. Hence, I shall continue to consider 
them as siblings.
ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND ACTION
Nussbaum’s accounts of anger and Transition-Anger differ from my accounts 
in another important respect. The payback wish present in anger and the 
‘something must be done about this’ of Transition-Anger invoke the common 
view that an essential feature of the emotions is that they incline us to act in 
various ways. I want to make three points about the relation of the emotions 
in general and of anger and indignation in particular to action.
First, I do not think action belongs essentially to the emotive. We must be 
careful to distinguish mere physical performances from action. For example, 
bodily expressions of the emotions are physical enactments of the emotions 
they express, but they do not, properly speaking, constitute actions. An 
action, as I understand it, is a physical performance undertaken in the light 
of an end, and bodily expressions of emotions are not undertaken in the light 
of an end. In other words, the physical performance is not the key to action; 
its being undertaken in the light of an end is what qualifies it as an action 
(although not necessarily a deliberate action). Therefore, when a basketball 
coach throws a chair across the court in his fury about a call that goes against 
his team, we might say that he is acting in anger, although he might not be 
acting in the proper sense of the term at all. However, if in throwing the chair 
he intends to strike the referee’s legs and cause him to fall and injure himself, 
then throwing the chair is not merely expressing anger or acting in anger. He 
is acting from anger for a certain purpose. Physiological changes and physical 
performances are intrinsic to emotions since we are embodied subjects, but 
actions in the proper sense of a physical performance undertaken in the light 
of an end are not.
Nor do I think, second, that desire with its inclination to action belongs 
essentially to the emotive. There are emotions whose ‘performance dimen-
sion’ seems to terminate in the expression of the emotion. Awe and wonder, 
for example, seem to be emotions that do not involve desires to act. They 
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involve bodily expressions similar to surprise reactions, but not desire. Joy 
too seems to terminate in bodily expressions, even exaggerated ones: jump-
ing for joy, raising both arms after scoring a hockey goal, punching the air in 
delight while yelling ‘yes!’, and so forth. Nor does desire seem a component 
of emotion in the phenomenon of being ‘struck’ by value (Mulligan 2009). 
Such experiences are often expressed by an exclamation or interjection, such 
as ‘how sad that is’ on hearing of a colleague’s serious illness, ‘how vulgar’ 
on witnessing someone’s behaviour, or ‘such generosity’ on hearing that 
someone has made a magnificent gift to an institution. These clearly involve 
emotions such as sadness, disgust, and admiration, but they do not arouse 
desire and motivate actions that arise from the emotion itself. Another exam-
ple might be when we think ‘that’s atrocious’ on seeing a film of innocent 
non-combatants killed by indiscriminate bombing (that expression might well 
be redundant; ‘surgical’ bombing too often turns out to be not very surgical). 
The emotion in this case is indignation about, say, rules of engagement in 
warfare that are permissive of actions within war that indiscriminately kill 
non-combatants or bombing raids wilfully undertaken in violation of laws of 
war (which might well be an oxymoronic expression).
Third, while desire and action are not essential components of emotion, 
I do want to consider how anger and indignation motivate action, when they 
do. Anger is often thought to have a close connection to action, inclining us, 
as we have seen, to act in such a way as to gain revenge or impose punish-
ment. This was explicit in Aristotle’s definition of anger as well as in Rob-
erts’s statement of the consequent concern of anger: ‘S deserves (ought) to 
be hurt for X; may S be hurt for X’. However, we also often think that, 
even when the anger is righteous, that is, well motivated and epistemically 
justified, the person offended both should control the bodily expression 
of anger –  don’t punch a hole in the wallboard – and should not act 
from his anger. Controlling one’s angry outbursts – in other words, 
habituating oneself not to desire revenge or punishment – is often thought a 
sign of virtue.
Nussbaum’s view that anger is always ‘normatively problematic, whether 
in the personal or in the public realm’ (Nussbaum 2016, 5) is motivated by 
the fact that anger inclines us to act in ways that are signs of vice. Although it 
is possible that anger signals the presence of wrongdoing and motivates us 
to repair it, Nussbaum believes that obsessively focusing on the down-
ranking of the offended one’s status is wrongheaded since questions of 
relative status should not take on such importance (2016, 15) and that 
payback is mistaken in thinking that punishing the wrongdoer repairs the 
wrong originally done (2016, 6). Nussbaum sums up her position as 
follows: ‘When anger makes sense, it is normatively problematic (focused 
narrowly on status); when it is normatively reasonable (focused on the 
injury), it doesn’t make good sense, and is normatively problematic in that 
different way’ (2016, 31).
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These ideas underlie Nussbaum’s discussion of the ‘Transition’ from 
thoughts of payback to ‘more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking 
what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare’ (2016, 
6) and of Transition-Anger which from the start is focused on reforms and 
reconciliation, whether this be in the domain of dealing with children or in our 
relation to political institutions. From my perspective, the close connection 
between anger and action is mitigated in indignation not only because it is a 
‘cooler’ emotion but because those wronged are often – but not necessarily – at 
a distance from us, unknown to us, or related to us only through the mediation 
of the socio-economic and political features of the situation occasioning indig-
nation. Given that indignation targets the offence or the conditions giving rise 
to the offence, the actions towards which it inclines us are different from the 
revenge or punishment aroused by anger – the ‘getting even’ (or better) with 
the offender. It is not that indignation, under the guise of Transition-Anger, is 
a borderline species of anger; it is that indignation has a different intentional 
structure that, insofar as it inclines us to act, is focused on different kinds of 
actions from anger proper.
Indignation can motivate a wide range of actions. When indignation is 
about a particular offence by a particular agent, any action motivated by 
indignation proper would be aimed at repairing or restoring the social or 
moral order disrupted by the offence, which action might or might not include 
punishment of the offender. When indignation recognizes the offence about 
which one is indignant as (i) conditioned by systemic situational factors and 
(ii) involving not merely individual agents operating independently but a pat-
tern of interconnected systems and practices, it opens the space for political 
actions that seek to correct not the wrong directly but the institutions, struc-
tures, and systems permissive or constitutive of that wrong. The intercon-
nections among these social systems and practices entail that many agents 
performing actions contributing to the offence are not conscious of acting 
so as to harm others – a fact confirmed, for example, by studies of implicit 
bias.2 In this context, indignation, which presupposes that the indignant agent 
has achieved some reflective awareness of the effect of these systems and 
practices, underlies not revenge or punishment but social, economic, and 
political reforms and attempts to reconcile the offending and offended parties. 
This view is similar to Nussbaum’s discussion of the practical implications 
of Transition-Anger, but, once again, in the face of important differences 
between anger and indignation, this similarity is insufficient to establish that 
indignation is a species of anger.
Indignant action can be more politically fruitful than angry action precisely 
because indignation is focused on the situation rather than the agents. It recog-
nizes that systemic problems such as racism, sexism, discrimination based on 
sexual preference, poverty, homelessness, and hunger will not be adequately 
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addressed by punishing a few – or even many – politicians who vote, say, 
against food stamps. Even if the agents deserve punishment, punishing them, 
say, by not reelecting them, is insufficient to correct the systemic issues that 
permit – or fail to mitigate – such problems (cf. Swaine 1996, 270). In such 
contexts, indignation that is not self-righteous and that incorporates a correct 
understanding of the moral order can be a force for good.
The criticisms of indignation, however, should not be ignored. At one 
extreme, the indignant subject’s self-awareness as morally superior becomes 
self-righteousness and motivates ineffectual condemnations of either or both 
the permissive systemic conditions or the offender without any attempts to 
right the wrongs produced by those systems or individuals. This excessive 
and unquestioning confidence in one’s own moral superiority is the negative 
side of indignation and the reason many identify indignation as a bad emo-
tion. At the other extreme, indignation, recognizing and despairing of the 
scope of the wrongs to which it is directed, can become a morally impotent 
indifference or nihilism. At either extreme, indignation loses its moral power. 
Indeed, it is one of those emotions whose name, in a sense, also identifies a 
virtue. Proper indignation is a mean between the vices of self-righteousness 
and moral indifference or nihilism. Proper indignation is a mark of virtue 
insofar as it is one of those ways in which the virtuous person has the right 
feelings.
What, then, should we make of the ‘fierce indignation’ referred to in 
Swift’s epitaph? The intentional structures of anger and indignation target 
both the offender and the offence, albeit in a different order. Consequently, 
as previously mentioned, they can easily slide into one another: indignation 
aimed at the offence by an agent can slide into anger at the offender for his 
offence, while anger at the offender can slide into indignation at the offence. 
More important for present purposes, anger and indignation can cohabit the 
same experience; this occurs, for example, when indignation at the offence 
combines with the intensity of anger and becomes focused intensely and 
equally on the offender and the offence. The resulting emotion is rage or out-
rage. Enraged subjects experience an emotion that is intense in the manner of 
anger, and their attention is aimed equally at the offence or systemic wrongs 
to which indignation is directed as well as the agents who promote, or fail to 
impede, these offences and wrongs. The aim of any actions motivated by such 
rage or outrage is both the reform or complete overthrow of the wrongs and 
systemic features permissive or constitutive of injustice and the punishment 
of those who perpetuate them.
Whereas political indignation is reformist, political anger and rage are, 
we might say, revolutionary. Indignation, political anger, and rage can all 
motivate positive action, but each carries a danger. Political anger or rage 
can lead to chaos and perhaps even terror, as the presumed perpetrators and 
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defenders of the established order are punished. But political indignation can, 
in some contexts, be ineffectual in bringing about enough change to root out 
the systemic causes of injustice. In such cases, political anger or rage might 
be appropriate, even when the cost to the indignant agent is high. Political 
anger or rage against oppressors – even when righteous – requires of an agent 
character traits that are ordinarily not considered virtuous and that damage an 
agent’s well-being. These are the kinds of situations that call forth what Tes-
sman (2005) calls ‘burdened virtues’.
In conclusion, considerations of these sorts reveal that anger and indigna-
tion are related emotions, but related as siblings rather than as genus to spe-
cies. Anger and indignation differ in their embodiment, in their intentional 
structure, and in their moral, socio-economic and political implications. 
Anger can be a rational emotion in response to agents who have wronged 
one in certain – but not in all – ways; trivial offences, for example, one’s car 
not starting or the child not making her bed in the morning, might be annoy-
ances, but an angry response to them is not appropriate. Offences that harm 
important aspects of one’s well-being, by contrast, might warrant an angry 
response. A virtuous agent will moderate her actions both in and from anger in 
proportion to the severity of the offence and her prudential judgements about 
the most effective ways to compensate for the wrong. Indignation, similarly, 
can be a rational and appropriate response to offences that challenge or hinder 
the establishment of a just social or moral order or to the systemic conditions, 
institutions, structures, and practices that cause unjust harm to individuals. 
For the virtuous person, indignation will motivate action, not angry attempts 
to return harm to individuals with harms to the offending persons but attempts 
to reform the systems that produce the harms to individuals or classes of 
individuals. In intractable cases, indignation will turn into political anger or 
rage. Once again, an agent must take care in determining how one is to act in 
and from political anger or rage. That, however, is a tale for another paper.
NOTES
 1 The third pertains to the issue of whether there are types of anger that do not 
involve a judgement of wrongfulness (Nussbaum 2016, 262). While I have advanced 
the view that the emotions contain a cognitive content (cf. supra, pp. 1–2), I do not 
claim that the cognitive content must be a propositional sense, that is, that the cogni-
tion must be a judgement (cf. Drummond 2013, 245–56). Hence, my view would be 
that there are clearly types of anger – and indignation – that do not involve judge-
ments of wrongfulness, although they would involve recognitions of wrongfulness.
 2 An overview of the ‘state of the science’ concerning implicit bias can be found 
in Staats et al. (2016); a bibliography of recent studies is included therein, pp. 94–106.
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